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THE PRIVY COUNCIL AND PRIVATE LAW IN
THE TUDOR AND STUART PERIOD: II*
John P. Dawsont
N a previous instalment an attempt was made to describe the main
subjects of private litigation dealt with by the English Privy Council under the Tudors and early Stuarts. It was suggested that the
subjects were most heterogeneous and that the total volume of such
litigation was large. In the present instalment will be discussed, first,
the methods used to reduce the volume of private litigation by direct
and indirect means; then the powers of coercion possessed by the Privy
Council; and finally, its relations to the ordinary courts.

I

D. Attempts to Reduce the Volume of Private Litigation
There can be no doubt that the clamor of private litigants was an
obstruction to public business and a burden to busy men. With the
whole machinery of government to supervise and maintain; with constant threats of invasion by foreign enemies; with religious dissent a
source of internal disaffection and the country riddled with spies; with
all these and many other problems pressing for attention the Privy
Council under Elizabeth still received and took action on an immense
number of private complaints.111' In the later years of her reign a
much higher percentage of cases was disposed of through arbitration,
with resulting saving of time and energy for the Council. Yet many
cases had at least a preliminary hearing. Some were heard at length.
Even to settle the terms of reference to a:i;bitrators, with the necessary
assurances of impartiality, diverted time and attention from matters
of high policy.
:r- The first instalment was published in the February issue, 48 MxcH. L. R:Ev. 393
(1950).-Ed.
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
The Privy Council Registers, to which numerous references must be made, will be cited
in the same manner as in the first instalment. The Registers of the Tudor period will be cited
by the names of their editors, Nicolas and Dasent, followed by the volume numbers in the
series they edited, The Registers of the early Stuart period, up to 1626 when the published
series ends, will be cited A.P.C., followed by the years covered by the volume in question.
115 Cf. the remarks of DAsENr, Introduction to vol. XIV, Aars oP nm PRIVY CoUNCIL,
p. x: "Nothing is more remarkable than the constant devotion with which this comparatively
trivial daily work was carried on by those whose whole energies might well have been absorbed
in the anxious consideration of the dangers which were so closely besetting the country and
the Queen. To Burghley and Walsingham, engaged in laboriously unravelling the tangled
threads of a skein of conspiracy and murder, the details of the settlement of a quarrel between
two Norfolk neighbors must have been supremely uninteresting."
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One should not, of course, exaggerate the degree of collective action required in dealing with this very large but comparatively unimportant business. The Council had for long had the practice of acting
through smaller committees taken from its own membership.116 For
private cases the regulations of the Council attempted at various times
to provide specific days for hearings, with participation by limited numbers taken from its own membership; these regulations were allowed
to lapse during the reign of Elizabeth but were revived under James
I.117 Furthermore, it seems extremely likely that many orders issued
in the name of the Council were actually framed by individual members to whom suitors secured access through persistence or personal
influence. It seems likely, too, that many such orders were never
recorded in the Council Register and escaped review by other Council
members or its secretarial staff.118
Even though the work was therefore not equally distributed throughout the Council as a whole, the volume of private litigation reached
such proportions in the reign of Elizabeth that something more was
needed than general warnings to the "obstinate and shameless haunters of the Court."119 In 1582 the Council set down an order that no
private petitions would be entertained in matters that could be dealt
116 BALDWIN, SELECT CASES BEFORE THE Knm's CouNCIL (Selden Society) xliv;
BALDWIN, THB KING'S CoUNcIL, 327-328.
117 A regulation of Jan. 15, 1552 fixed Monday of evezy week as the day for hearing
private suits. LITERARY REMAINS OF EDWARD VI, vol. II, 552. Sir Julius Caesar preserved
among his papers a lengthy order of the same year which specified no particular day for
hearings but provided for meetings once a week and set up a committee of eight persons.
BRIT. Mus. LANsn. ms., fol. 100-103.
Shortly after the accession of James I, on May 30, 1603, regulations were issued setting
aside Tuesday afternoons for the hearing of private suitors with six Privy Councillors "at the
least" to attend. Dasent XXXII 499 (1603). Under Charles I, Wednesday and Friday
afternoons were set aside for suitors, though apparently without any attempt to allocate the
work to a limited group of Councillors. CLARENDON, STATE PAPERS, vol. I, 34. In fact the
Council Register after the accession of James I regularly listed the names of the Councillors
responsible for the issuance of Privy Council orders, and in most instances the number listed
for orders issued in private cases was less than ten persons.
118The order of April 15, 1582 (Dasent XIII 394), which attempts to restrict the
private litigation to be handled by the Council, recites that many letters issued in the name
of the Council had been signed by Councillors without being reviewed for form by any of
the clerks of the Council and without being recorded in the Council Register. The order
then provides that no letter shall be signed or issued unless it has endorsed in the margin
at the bottom the name of some clerk of the Council.
Occasionally an order issued in the name of the Council bears internal evidence of having
been•drafted by an individual Privy Councillor. Dasent XIV 234 (1586); XXV 13, 189
(1595-6). In another case it appeared that certain persons had been ordered by a single
Councillor to appear before the Council in a private dispute. XIV 50 (1586).
119 The language used in the general order of 1552 preserved by Caesar in BRIT. Mus.
LANsn. ms. 161, fol. 102.
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with in the ordinary courts "onless they sball concerne the preservacion
of her Majesties peace or shalbe of some publicke consequence to
touche the government of the Realme."120 The only result of this
order, in the years immediately following, was an actual increase in
private business. A new order entered seven years later recited that
the Council was "so troubled and pestred" with private suitors that it
could scarcely attend to the business of the state and the judges of the
ordinary courts "doe thereby :6nde cause of offence as derogating the
laufull authority of the said Courtes and places of judgment." The
remedy again was a general order of dismissal of suits triable in ordinary courts of law or equity, but with two provisos: (I) that any litigant so dismissed would be heard if he could not get his case tried in
the ordinary courts and (2) that no person should be denied the right
to complain to the Council of "anie wrong, wilfull delay or deniall of
justice" by any Court.121 Similar orders were issued during the next
decade, some general and some directed at particular classes of suitors.122
More important, the Council began to adopt the one really effective
means of discouraging private suitors, by actually dismissing the cases
most obviously suitable for decision in established courts.123
E. Appeal to the Source of Justice

With the accession of James I in 1603, the problem was attacked
in a different way-that is, through the resumption by the King of a.
personal authority as judge and mediator. As in other phases of the
shift from Tudor to Stuart conceptions of government, this change
marked no sharp break in institutional development. During the sixteenth century there had been instances of personal intervention by the
120 Dasent XIII 394 (1582).
121 Dasent XVIII 183 (1589).
122 Dasent XXI 240 (1591), Masters

of Requests ordered to review all private petitions
pending and remit to the ordinary courts those cases triable there; Dasent XXill 82 (1592),
general dismissal of Irish suitors whose cases were triable in ordinary courts; Dasent XXVIII
508 (1598), officers in the Channel Isles ordered to make strenuous efforts to prevent cases
from coming up to the Council.
123 In the earlier period there had been isolated instances of dismissals to the common
law courts: Dasent ill 113 (1550); and to the Chancery: Nicolas VII 276 (1541); Dasent
V 163 (1555); VIII 271 (1574); IX 344 (1577); XI 352 (1579); XIV 50, 117, 299 (15867); XV 300 (1587). After the order of 1589 there was a much larger number of cases
similarly dismissed: to the common law courts: Dasent XX 251 (1591); XXVII 465 (1597);
XXX 697 (1600); A.P.C. 1623-5, 166 (1623); to the Chancery: XVII 246 (1589); XVIII
195 (1589); XIX 187 (1590); XX 160, 250 (1590-1); XXII 126 (1591); XXIV 409
(1593); XXV 271, 301, 346 (1596); XXVIII 445 (1598); XXXII 174 (1601); A.P.C.
1616-17, 72 (1616); A.P.C. 1625-6, 389 (1626). It is possible of course that other dismissals may have occurred without formal entry in the Register.

630

MmmGAN-LAw fuvmw

[ Vol. 48

King or Queen in private litigation. Private suitors constantly clamored for royal intervention. In some cases private complaints had been
referred to the Council for action, with or without specific instructions
for their disposition.124 But the conception of the soyereign as a personal dispenser of justice was one not easily abandoned, especially by
those clamorous litigants who rightly believed that oil was usually provided for the squeakiest wheels. The channel for access to the sovereign was organized and available-the Masters of Requests, who not
only served as judges in their own court and as men of all work for the
Council,125 but who had a separate function as personal agents of the
King or Queen in dealings with private suitors.126
The intention of James I to assume a more direct personal responsibility was soon disclosed. Less than two months after his accession,
on May 12, 1603, a formal record was commenced of action taken on
petitions addressed directly to the King. The manuscript register, so
far unpublished, refers to many petitions quite unconnected with
private litigation-for pardons to criminals and remission of criminal
penalties, for grants of royal land and royal offices, for alms, for licenses
to publish books, for confirmation of royal charters and the grant or
cancellation of royal monopolies. The register was apparently kept
by the Masters of Requests and gives abundant evidence both of their
close personal contact with the King and the King's own active interest
in the business it records.127
124 Nicolas VII 240 (1541); Dasent III 382 (1551); XI 108, 149 (1579); XIV i69
(1586); XXI 109 (1591), the Queen in this case having directed the Council to arrest a
principal whose default had caused his surety to be imprisoned: XXIII 184 (1592); XXIV
42 (1592), the Queen in this case having indicated her desire that no "rigorous course" be
permitted against sheriffs who had allowed a prisoner to escape. In Dasent XXX 492 (1600),
the Council added its own warning to a litigant, to obey an order of the Queen that pending
litigation be stayed.
125 J'he services of the Masters of Requests as agents of the Council took a variety of
forms. They conducted preliminary examinations, served as arbitrators either alone or in the
company of others, were sent on diplomatic missions, and in fact were available for any administrative functions that the Council might assign. To catalogue them here would be unprofitable.
126 The Council itself in one instance at least used the Masters of Requests as an avenue
for intercession with the Queen in a matter requiring her personal approval: Dasent XXVIII
452 (1598), involving authority to collect charitable contributions throughout the realm
for the inhabitants of a town destroyed by fire. In other cases Masters of Requests were asked
to notify the Queen of measures taken by the Council to dispose of the complaints, addressed
to both the Council and the Queen, by exceptionally persistent suitors. Dasent XXV 301, 346
(1596).
In S.P. Dom., vol. 247, no. 66 there is a copy of a draft proclamation, dated Feb. 17,
1593, which attempted to deal with the great concourse of suitors at the Queen's court by
assigning to the Masters of Requests a room outside the court gates at which they were to
receive private suitors for one hour of every morning and afternoon.
127 The manuscript is BRIT. Mus. LANsD. ms. 266. It commences with entries of May
12, 1603 and the last date recorded is June, 1616. It comprises 289 folio pages, written in
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The recourse thus opened to private suitors quickly proved extremely popular. In slightly more than a year, from May 12, 1603,
through the end of May, 1604, a total of 466 private disputes were
dealt with. As compared with the work of the Elizabethan Privy Council, there was much less emphasis on aid to merchants, but relief to
debtors through protections and through mediation with creditors
remained a principal activity.128 There were occasional, though comseveral different hands. Continuity was not strictly maintained but for the most part the
entries were consecutive. Some care was shown to keep it accurate though the entries,
especially in private cases referred to arbitration, were very brief and often quite uninformative.
Entries which help to identify the persons responsible for maintaining the register are
the signatures by Roger Wilbraham on fol. 15b (July, 1603), 147b (1611), and 250a (1614).
This would be the Roger Wilbraham who was confirmed in office as Master of Requests by
James I and sworn in on May 4, 1603 [Dasent XXXII 497 (1603)], and who as Master of
Requests signed two orders of the King in response to private petitions, directed to the Justices
of the Common Pleas and the Chancellor the following year [MoNRo, AcrrA CANcBLLARIAB,
36-41 (1847)]. An entry on fol. 265a (1614) recites that a previous order of reference had
been made by Sir Christopher Parkins, a Master of Requests. It seems likely that many such
orders of a routine character were made without personal consultation with the King.
That a distinction was maintained between the judicial functions of the Masters of
Requests and their responsibilities in acting on petitions to the King is indicated by the case
of William Holden and wife, complaining of a dismissal of their petition filed in the Court of
Requests. The entry then proceeds: "Forasmuch as it hath ben often complayned of by the
peticoners that I gave the order for the said dismission his Majestie is pleased that the cause
shalbe reheard by the other Ms of Requests in my absence," with the further provision that
if no cause was found to alter the decree the petitioners were directed to trouble the King
no further. BRIT. Mus. LANsD. ms. 266, fol. 243a (1614).
12s Only one general commission aiming to clear debtors' jails is recorded, that appointed
on July 2, 1603 for the prisoners in Norwich jail (BRIT. Mus. LANSD. ms. 266, fol. 9a). In
all other cases action was taken on petitions of individual debtors (some of them being of
course already imprisoned). The usual solution was the appointment of an arbitral commission to mediate for "tolleration," or, in the phrase which later became standard, "a
charitable composicion." In the period May 12, 1603 through the end of May, 1604, out
of 416 cases of all types referred to arbitrators 67 involved arbitration with creditors. There
was a much higher percentage in the three calendar years 1612, 1613, and 1614. For the
three years together the total of cases referred to arbitrators was 282, of which 129 (or 45%)
involved arbitration with creditors.
In addition, petition direct to the King was an avenue for securing protections to
distressed debtors. The protections, almost always for the period of a year, were sometimes
granted on the unanimous requests of the creditors (BRIT, Mus. LANsD. ms. 266, fol. 109a,
162, 166b, 193a), though more commonly on the petition of the debtor [ibid., fol. 80b,
82b, 123b, 138b, 140b, 159a, 182a (2 cases), 183b, 194a]. In the case on fol. 170b (1611),
13 out of I 7 creditors petitioned for a protection to their debtor, the other four being
"obstinate."
In 1615 the King seemed to be moving in the direction of arranging discharge for a
bankrupt debtor, who had delivered up all his goods to a commission of bankrupts and who
petitioned for release from imprisonment "to seeke meanes to maintayne himselfe wife &
children." The entry states that "This sute seeminge to his Matie in apparance to be reasonable," the King's pleasure is that the bankruptcy commissioners should call the creditors
and persuade them to give plaintiff his liberty "to endevor some course of life to maintayne
his wife and family in this his necessitie," in view of his voluntary payment of a large part
of his debts and his surrender of all his assets for the purpose. BRIT. Mus. LANsD. ms. 266,
fol. 284b (1615).
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paratively rare, examples of attempts to facilitate litigation in ordinary
courts or otherwise to supervise the administration of justice.129 In
other respects the cases dealt with were even more heterogeneous than
the cases brought before the Elizabethan Council. A very large percentage dealt with title to land, or claims to recover possession of land,
including complaints on the ground of enclosures, obstruction to commons, and eviction of farm tenants.130 There were complaints arising
from the forfeiture of bonds and mortgages, claims of fraud inducing
payments of money or conveyances of land, complaints for wrongful
detention of goods, and very many actions to C<?llect simple money
debts. There was a complaint by a mother against two other women
for ''bewitchinge her child,"131 an action brought by an aged deaf lady
against the churchwardens of her church to have a seat near the pulpit
where she could hear the preacher,132 and the complaint of four persons, so characteristic of the time, "for drawinge them to be surties and
· soe leave them in the lurtch."133 The petitions record every conceivable kind of hardship, wrong, and oppression, and reB.ect a simple
faith in the remedies that the great power and authority of the King
could supply.
· The normal remedy provided, again, was arbitration. During the
period from May 12, 1603, through May 31, 1604, out of 466 ·cases
-involving private litigation 416 were referred to commissions "to hear
and end,""to persuade a ch anta
· ble compos1c1on,
· · " or "to compound
the differences according to equitie and charitie." In later years the
total of petitions recorded was considerably reduced, but references to
arbitration remained in the vicinity of 80%. The chief reliance was
on the country gentry, who must have found their duties as arbitrators
extremely wearisome. However, all kinds of dignitaries were employed
129 Orders to speed decision in cases pending in common law courts and the Chancery
(BRIT. Mus. LANSD. ms. 266, fol. 4a, 2Oa, 191b, 213b, 215b, 266a); orders for change of venue
in criminal cases because of suspected partiality (ibid., 211 b, 233b); order for the impanelling
of an impartial jury (ibid., fol. 22b); petition aiming to prevent decision in the Chancery
after a hearing at which plaintiff's counsel was not present (ibid., fol. 2O2b); order not
to proceed with case in which petitioner had been unable to sue out a writ of error for
reversal of the judgment rendered in the Common Pleas, because of the absence on circuit
of all the judges of the King's Bench (ibid., fol. 182b-183a); authority to Coke, Chief
Justice of the King's Bench, to arrest with a serjeant at arms a defendant in a King's Bench
action who has failed to appear after a commission of rebellion (ibid., 258b, April, 1614).
130 See first instalment, note 83, 48 MICH. L. R.Ev. 393 at 419 (1950).
131 BRIT. Mus. LANsn. ms. 266, fol. 12b (1603), the complaint being referred to the
Justices of Assize for decision according to "justice." ,
132Ibid., fol. 217a (1612), the churchwardens being directed to arrange for a different
pew if this could be done without undue prejudice to the other parishioners.
· 133 Ibid., fol. 13b (1603), the case being referred to a commission of arbitrators.
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-nobility, eminent clergy, and officers of the towns-and the common
law judges and practicing lawyers were ver:y prominent. Francis Bacon
served as a referee,1 34 and Coke was frequently called upon, during his
service both as Attorney General and as Chief Justice of Common Pleas
and King's Bench.135 The motive usually expressed in the letters of
appointment was "that his Majestie be no more troubled" or "to ease
his Majestie." There is no reason to doubt the truthfulness of this
explanation. The importunate suitors must have been as heavy a
burden to the King as they had been to the Privy Council. The wonder
is that their ·complaints were received and forwarded with so little
attempt at selection or at major reduction in volume.136
In a small percentage of cases more positive measures were taken,
through personal order of the King directing the defendant to satisfy
the petitioner or show cause to the King. This solution was apparently
reserved for cases in which the fault of the defendant seemed clear;
usually some inequality of status was also present between the parties.137 Like the references to arbitration, these affirmative orders
134 Ibid., fol. llb (1603).
135Jhid., fol. Sa (1603), 25b (1603), 54b (1605), 80a (1607), 153a (16ll) (2 cases),
2lla (1612), 238a (1613), 252a (1614), 271b (1615).
136 There were of course some dismissals to the ordinary courts, though the surprising
fact is their small number. In the period May 12, 1603 through May 31, 1604 there were
out of 466 cases of private litigation only 20 dismissed to courts of common law or equity.
Occasionally there appear such laudable statements as that "It was not his Mats intencon
neither doth it appeere by his direction that any Course of Justice in any of his Mats Courts
shalbe stayed by the former significacon of his Mats pleasure." [BmT. Mus. LANsn. ms. 266,
fol. 14b (1603)].
In some cases there are difficulties in determining the nature of referrals to ordinary
courts, illustrated by the case on folio IOa, where the plaintiff claimed that his name had
been forged on a bond and the complaint was referred to the local justices of the peace to
compound the cause "according to justice." The implication is that this is arbitration, but
it might be possible for the referees under the authority given to direct the case to ordinary
common law trial. In the calculations made, such cases are treated as references for ordinary trial.
The overriding difficulty of classification comes in selecting out the cases of private
litigation appropriate for trial in courts of law and equity, from the multitude of petitions
for royal grace, in some of which adverse claimants appeared to demand the bounty for
themselves.
137 Petitions alleging non-payment of money debts in which the defendant ordered to
"satisfy or answer": BRIT. Mus. LANsn. ms. 266, fol. 12b, 32b, 35b, 36a, 105a, ll2a, ll3a,
226a, 239a, 249b, 258b, 260a, 272b, 277a, 289b, the last reference being an order directed to
Sir Walter Raleigh; petitions for "land": ibid., fol. 16a, 43a, 153b, 205a; for goods detained:
ibid., fol. 12b; for destruction of commons and eviction of farm tenants: ibid., l0a, 12a, 13a,
16a, ll5a, 152a, 236b; other miscellaneous cases in which the same form of order was
entered: ibid., fol. IOb, 15b, 18b, 34b, 35a, 224a, 264a, 267a, 276b. In the case on fol. 45a
appeared the unusual order to the defendant "to forbeare extremitie and deale charitablie
or make answer."
In one instance, in 1614, the King appointed commissioners to take order that land
given by Edward VI in trust for a charitable use but diverted to private purposes should be
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seldom led to proceedings by way of enforcement or further contest.138
We are left to surmise that such orders, invested with the personal
authority of the King, were promptly complied with. If this surmise
is not correct, it appears at least that enforcement measures were left
to other agencies, such as the Privy Council, and that the settlement
of disputed issues was referred to other courts.139 For neither purpose
was a new and distinct procedure organized. With so many other
demands pressing for the attention of the King-including demands
for favors, gifts and privileges of every conceivable kind-a truly judicial procedure for handling so large a volume of private disputes would
have required the very rapid organization of another prerogative court.
restored to the original charitable use (BRIT. Mus. LANso. ms. 266, fol. 258b). In 1611
a garnishment order was issued to a third person who owed money to the plaintiff's debtor
(ibid., fol. 109a). Perhaps one should add to the cases of specific relief, the old lady and
her pew, mentioned above in note 132.
138 Most of the cases referred to arbitration disappear thereafter, without even a report
back from the arbitrators. However, in two cases orders were entered directing performance
of arbitral awards (BmT. Mus. LANso. ms. 266, fol. 45a, 116b) and in 1609 letters were
addressed to the creditors of John Cleyton "who wilfully refused to obey a former reference
and to give the said Cleton anie daies of paiement as divers other creditors had donne"
(BRIT. Mus. LANso. ms. 266, fol. 124b).
There was apparently only one case in which an order directing affirmative action,
issued in the name of the King, led to any further steps. This was in the petition of one
Parson against Sir William Paston, for non-payment of a £60 debt. On failure of the defendant
to obey the order to pay, the order was merely repeated in letters addressed to the defendant,
giving a month's time limit. BmT. Mus. LANso. ms. 266, 12b (1603).
139 In 1611, for example, Sir Henry Billingsley, who had a Chancery decree in his
favor for land in Wales, sought to have the defendant "removed by the power of the contrye"
from the possession which he withheld. The case was referred to the Privy Council, to take
order for the suppression of this alleged "outrage" (BmT. Mus. LANso. ms. 266, fol. 174a).
Problems of enforcement also arose in connection with royal protections against civil
litigation. In one case, where local deputy sheriffs were sued at common law for deferring
to a protection and refraining from executing process against the protected debtor, the King
merely wrote to the creditors directing them not to proceed with their actions against the
officers unless cause were shown. BmT. Mus. LANsD. ms. 266, fol. 213a. But where it
appeared that the creditors were proceeding, in direct violation of the protection, to sue
the original debtor, the King referred the matter to Coke, Chief Justice of the King's Bench,
requesting him to call the parties and if he found that the protection had been "contemptuously disobeyed" to take order for the punishment of the offenders. BmT. Mus.
LANsD. ms. 266, fol. 262b (June, 1614).
In a substantial group of cases it is likely that referrals to the established courts was
motivated by the disclosure of serious, controverted issues which the King thought it incon·
venient to dispose of through the petition procedure. The point can be illustrated again
with protections, where a claim that the original grant was based on false information was
referred to two common law judges for decision (BRIT. Mus. LANso. ms. 266, fol. 155a);
a claim that the protected debtor had abused his immunity by using it to withhold two
obligations transferred to him in trust was committed to the Lord Mayor and two aldermen
of London for decision (ibid., fol. 84a); and the demands of creditors for the cancellation
of a protection as unduly prejudicial to them were referred to the Lord Chancellor for
adjudication (ibid., fol. 78b and 84b).
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It might not have been too clear to contemporaries, though it seems
clear in retrospect, that the principal contribution made by this summary royal justice was to provide an additional channel for private•
arbitration. At times it must have seemed that considerably more was
involved. In other cases, not recorded in the manuscript register, James
took the time to render judicial decisions in contested cases; apparently
he fancied himself in the role.140 Quite apart from these instances of
royal adjudication, however, the manuscript register of royal petitions
reveals a constant and indiscriminate intervention by the King in all
kinds of private litigation, with summary action under the King's own
personal authority on a very large number of cases appropriate for ordinary trial. In the controversies with Coke, which had already begun,
the power of judicature was elevated into a great constitutional issue,
involving basic questions as to the nature and sources of law and the
limits of political authority. In the King's own personal entourage it
appeared that he considered himself the personal dispenser of justice
in almost the same sense that he was the dispenser of alms and other
royal favors. It was no wonder that some persons took alarm.
For the Privy Council this summary jurisdiction of the King must
have meant some relief from the distractions of private suitors. Unfortunately, the register of the Privy Council for the first ten years of
James I was destroyed in the great £re at Whitehall in 1618, and we
therefore have no means to trace the effect_ on Privy Council business
of this recourse to the King.141 Shortly after the Privy Council Regis140 Hudson

describes in his TREATISE ON THB CounT oP STAR CHAMBER 9, in 2
JURIDrCA, the "accurately eloquent, judiciously grave, and honourably just" decree that James rendered as presiding judge in the Star Chamber, after hearing
and argument in a single case that lasted five days. The most celebrated effort of James
in this sphere, demonstrating very clearly the dangers inherent in his pretensions, was the
case of the unhappy Earl of Ormond, discussed at length by Bake, "A Princely Judgment,"
23 MINN. L. RBv. 925 (1939).
l41 The register of royal petitions for the years 1603-1616 reveals several references to
the Privy Council of matters originally presented by way of petition to the King. It is easy
to understand why examination by the Council was thought necessary in some cases, as in
the dispute between the city of York and the royal Council at York over the limits of the
latter's judicial powers (BRIT. Mus. LANsD. ms. 266, fol. 232b), a dispute over title to the
office of Marshal in Ireland (ibid., fol. 155b), controversies over the regulation of particular
trades (ibid., 6b, 7a, 54b), and the demand of the watermen of London that the London
players be required to return to their theater at the riverside so that the unemployment among
the petitioners could be relieved (ibid., 245a). Issues of general state policy might also have
been involved in two enclosure cases that were similarly referred (ibid., fol. 154a, 266b).
In the other cases of ordinary private litigation that were referred to the Privy Council no
reason can be suggested except the likelihood that the decision of disputed issues would
take time and trouble (ibid., fol. 77b, 83a, 87a, 91a, 126a, 224a). The King may have
thought himself disqualified from passing on the claim of a Scottish lady against Sir William
HARGRAVE, CotLBCTANBA
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ter resumes, the register• of royal petitions ceases, and it is impossible to
say whether this type of personal intervention continued on the same
, scale in the second half of James' reign or in the reign of his son
Charles. The Register of the Privy Council for this later period indicates that all the main types of civil litigation dealt with by the Elizabethan Council continued to appear, though in much reduced volume.
Whether or not the reduction in private business was made easier to
achieve by assistance from the King, the Council itself imposed a
stricter self-limitation and concentrated the energies of its membership
on its primary task, the government of England.

F. The Powers of the Council There remain some crucial questions as to the powers of the Council. The discussion has already suggested that these powers were wide.
Further analysis is needed of (I) the speci6.c powers of coercion available and (2) the relations of the Council with established courts of
law and equity.
1. Powers of Coercion

Of all the instruments of coercion available, by all odds the most
useful were the recognizance and penal bond. The recognizance, like
the bond, consisted of an acknowledgment of indebtedness for a speci6.ed sum of money, conditioned to be void if the obligor complied with
the requirement laid upon him, and speci6.ed in the obligation. Such
obligations were mentioned, often quoted in full, throughout the
Council Register. By authority conferred in 1540 any individual
member of the Council was permitted to take recognizances "in matiers
touching the King";142 it seems likely that this authority was continued
and that matters "touching the King" were very broadly de6.ned. Recognizances were used for a great variety of purposes unconnected with
private litigation. The most common was the recognizance conditioned
on keeping the peace. They were also used, for example, to impose
on a large landholder the affirmative duty to maintain his tenants and
followers in religious conformity;143 to compel a man "to refrayne the
Hilliard for "cutting & spoilinge her fetherbedcls, silke curtaines, and other things in her
house & abusinge her in wordes" (ibid., fol. 167b). This seems unlikely.
For the period starting in 1613 for which the Privy Council Register is preserved there
, are some examples of cases referred from the King to the Privy Council for action: A.P.C.
1618-19, 211, 222, 232, 236 (1618); A.P.C. 1621-3, 13 (1621); A.P.C. 1623-5, 58, 130,
148, 151, 217, 415; A.P.C. 1626, 62.
142 Nicolas VII 27, 35 (1540).
14s Dasent XXXI 137 (1601).
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company" of another man's wife;144 to protect a wife against physical
violence from her own husband;145 and to carry out an elaborate scheme
for rent control and construction of new rental housing as a solution
for the problems caused by enclosures in a particular local community .146
In the field of private litigation bonds or recognizances were used
most frequently as a means of ensuring attendance before the Council
by litigants. The sums expressed in such obligations varied with the
status and financial ability of the litigants, but they were substantial
sums ranging from £20 to £500 and occasionally more. Recognizances
were also used to enforce specific duties imposed upon litigants, such
as the duty to pay a debt owed to a foreign merchant,147 the duty to
restore cattle wrongfully distrained,148 or a duty not to disturb the
possession of land pending decision of litigation concerning it in the
Chancery.149 Where the Queen or the Council undertook to decide
a case, the normal procedure was to secure a recognizance from both
parties to abide their award.150 The whole system of private arbitration organized by the Council depended very largely on the standard
practice of exacting from each of the litigants bonds to carry out the
arbitrators' decision, a practice strongly recommended to arbitrators by
the Council on numerous occasions and sometimes enforced by the
Council's own precautions.151
It seems likely that both the recognizance and the bond performed
their chief function through putting the signers in fear. There are
nevertheless some few examples of bonds put in suit by order of the
Council; a record of technical forfeiture was particularly helpful where
no other means were readily available to ensure satisfaction to the
144 Dasent V 174 (1555).
145 Dasent XIX 313 (1590).
146 Dasent II 294 (1549), inhabitants

of the town being required to enter recognizances
to carry out the Council's detailed regulations. The case is further commented on by TAWNEY,
THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM IN THE SucrEENI'H CENTURY 369-70 (1912).
•
147 Dasent I 14 (1542).
148 Nicolas VII 253, 255 (1541).
149 Dasent VI 294 (1558).
150 Nicolas VII 52 (1540); Dasent I 49 (1542); VII 269 (1565).
151 illustrations of bonds taken from the parties by the Council itself, conditioned that
they abide the awards of arbitrators: Dasent I 19 (1542); XI 92 (1579); XV 347 (1588);
XXill 7 (1592). In Dasent X 281. (1578), the Council entered an affirmative order to the
parties to execute such bonds. Strangely enough, there is almost no evidence of the treatment that litigants could expect if they had the temerity to refuse to assume such dangerous
liabilities. In Dasent IX 215 (1576), one Roos, a gentleman of Nottingham, had refused
to accept the two arbitrators named by Justice Dyer, to whom the case had been referred.
The Council merely asked the Earl of Rutland to persuade Roos to enter a bond to perform
the award of two other arbitrators.
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party wronged.102 Furthermore, the record of Council action may
give an incomplete picture of the real impact of the bond. Where it
ran by its terms to an adverse litigant, rather than to the Crown, no
formal action by the Council would be required to put it into suit.
Even on obligations acknowledged to the Crown forfeitures through
suit in the Exchequer might have occurred, especially through the
vigilance of informers who hoped for a share in the proceeds as their
reward. The best evidence that this indirect sanction had real coercive
effect is its widespread use for a very wide range of purposes. It is in
fact of some interest that the penal bond, which provided more cause
for resort to Tudor equity courts than any other feature of the common
law system, was thus appropriated to the purposes of prerogative equity
and remained at all times one of its most useful instruments.
Process against property provided a more direct sanction. Its most
common form was the order for sequestration of land or goods, a type
of order freely used in the sixteenth century Chancery. Sequestration
was available not only as an interim measure to preserve property involved in litigation,153 but as a sanction against persons evading the
process of the Council or disobeying its decrees.154 By way of sanction the Council could also enter orders that can best be described as
garnishment, directing third persons who owed money to disobedient
defendants to hold it available for satisfaction of the plaintiffs.155 To
overcome resistance to its orders for surrender of property, there could
152 Orders by the Council to put bonds in suit because of failure to perform arbitral
awards: Dasent VIII 21 (1574); A.P.C. 1621-3, 91 (1621); order to sue on a bond, in the
Exchequer, if creditors continue their refusal to appear before the commission for Poor
Prisoners: Dasent XXV 110 (1595); orders to sue on bonds guaranteeing appearance in the
Admiralty as the only means of securing satisfaction of claims for wrongful seizure of goods:
Dasent I 411 (1546); XXV 105 (1595).
153 Sequestration ordered pending decision by the Council: Dasent XII 261, 265, 351
(1580-1); pending decision by ordinary courts before which actions had been brought:
Dasent XII 71 (1580); XX 216, 271, 291 (1591); pending decision by arbitrators appointed
by the Council: XX 249, 331 (1591).
154 Sequestration ordered against persons evading process of the Council: Dasent XX
100 (1590); XXIV 361 (1593); to compel payment of a debt ordered paid to a foreign
merchant: Dasent XXV 189 (1596); to compel a husband to comply with order for his
wife's support: Dasent I 48, 81 (1542). Without prior decree of the Council, sequestration
was ordered to enforce the duty of executors under the will of the decedent: Dasent XV 13
(1587); and to prevent a creditor from effecting a fraudulent transfer of his debtor's assets:
Dasent XIX 214 (1590). In A.P.C. 1613-14, 50 (1614), an order equivalent to sequestration was entered by letters directing the master of a ship about to sail to unload goods from
his vessel and deposit them in safekeeping, to prevent the owner, an Italian merchant, from
shipping the goods abroad to defeat his English creditors.
155 Dasent X 363 (1578), and XI 299 (1579), both involving proceedings against a
husband to compel support of his wife; XIV 16 (1586), involving a defendant who had
evaded process of the Council for his arrest on a charge of fraud.
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likewise be no doubt of the Council's power to invoke superior force
and then to punish by arrest and criminal prosecution.156 The chief
executive agency of the state, that stood so ready to overcome resistance
to the process of ordinary courts,157 was scarcely prepared to tolerate
resistance to such orders of its own.
- The direct sanction most often employed was personal arrest. The
possession of a large and undefined power of arrest was assumed in the
numerous cases in which the Council ordered the apprehension of suspected criminals, including those suspected of political crimes. In civil
litigation, arrest was used as a means to compel attendance before the
Council.158 It was also used as a sanction for the "contempt" involved
in disobedience of the Council's orders, including orders for paymerit
of money debts.159 Arrest under the council's authority was the normal
means for supporting the process of ordinary courts.160 Enforcement
of the awards of its own arbitral commissions was also undertaken by
arrest or threat of arrest.161 In addition, the Council employed arrest
in a number of situations involving no disobedience of any prior order,
where the civil wrong was clear and strong measures seemed appropriate. One can lay aside those cases in which a contempt of the
Council might be found for independent reasons, such as the arrest
in a civil action of a party already in the custody of the Council's
officers;162 or in which the conduct charged involved criminal as well
as civil liabilities.163 A mere refusal of a debtor to satisfy his creditors,
156 Dasent XIV 169, 178, 209, 233, 284 (1586-7), all the entries involving a single
case of resistance to an order of the Council for surrender of possession of land, the last
order directing that the persons guilty be brought before the Star Chamber for trial. Other
instances of sequestration of land detained by violence: A.P.C. 1623-5 170, 218 (1624).
Hi7 See first instalment, 48 Ml:cH. L. RBv. 393 at 401 (1950).
111s Dasent X 356 (1578); XIX 291 (1590); XXIII 28 (1592); XXV 189 (1596);
XXVIII 351 (1598); A.P.C. 1616-17, 232 (1617); A.P.C. 1619-21, 33 (1619); A.P.C.
1621-3, 137 (1622).
111 9 Nicolas VII 333 (1542); Dasent X 435 (1578); XIV 252 (1586); XV 349 (1588);
XX 202 (1591); XXI 55 (1591); A.P.C. 1621-3, 417 (1623); A.P.C. 1623-5, 232 (1624);
A.P.C. 1625-6, 394 (1626). Similarly, orders for support of wife or child: A.P.C. 1621-3,
383 (1623); A.P.C. 1623-5, 480 (1625).
l60 Dasent XX 50 (1590), Court of Requests; X 401 (1578), Court of Delegates;
A.P.C. 1621-3, 155, 513 (1622-3), London Court of Aldermen, the second of these involving the recommittal of a prisoner already released on habeas corpus by the King's Bench.
Additional references are given in the first instalment, 48 MlcH. L. RBv. 393 at 401 (1950).
161 See first instalment, note 106, 48 Ml:cH. L. RBv. 393 at 424 (1950).
162 Dasent XX 199 (1591); A.P.C. 1621-3, 484 (1623).
163 For example, the special commission authorized to arrest a person charged with
carrying away goods of a decedent from a house in which he died: Dasent XII 123, 168
(1580); and the numerous orders for arrest of persons charged with "spoiling" goods from
merchant vessels, illustrated by Dasent I 278 (1545). No attempt has been made to collect
the very numerous examples of arrest of suspected criminals, ordered brought up for examination.

640

MmmGAN LAw REVIEW

[ Vol. 48

when possessing adequate assets for the purpose, was considered sufficient ground. 164 Arrest was also authorized for the failure of a lessor
to comply with the covenants of his lease of a house to the French
Ambassador,165 and as a means to bring an exacting creditor "to more
conforrnitie" as to a fo1Jeiture he was trying to exact.166
The activities of the Council on behalf of distressed debtors, in
the later years of Elizabeth, apparently provided the first strong challenge of the Council's power to arrest. It was in answer to the attempt
to enforce a royal protection to a debtor that the Court of Common
Pleas in 1587 took the drastic step of releasing on habeas corpus a
prisoner whose imprisonment had originally been authorized by the
Queen.167 The Commission for Poor Prisoners, appointed in 1590,
was clearly given, by delegation from the Council, the power to arrest
for disobedience to its orders.168 The energetic activities of the
Commission, under promptings from the Council, involved not only
frequent interference with common law actions by creditors but largescale resort to the sanction of arrest. These activities, added to the
routine enforcement measures used in other types of cases, will probably explain the famous protest of the common law judges in June,
1591. The protest was addressed to the Chancellor and Treasurer,
,vho had asked "divers" of the judges to state their opinions as to when
164 Dasent

XI J99 (1579); XXI 403 (1591).
VII 365 (1570).
l66 Dasent XIX 351 (1590), the creditor being already imprisoned on another ground
and being ordered detained until he abandoned his effort to enforce a bond for £200 on
which only £12 was due.
167 Searche's Case, 1 Leo. 70, 74 Eng. Rep. 65 (1587), where the Queen had given
a protection to one Mabbe with a provision that any person arresting him or his sureties
was to be arrested by the Queen's own officers and detained in prison until he had answered
his contempt to the Privy Council. Searche, who had arrested one of Mabbe's sureties, was
accordingly arrested for violation of the protection, was released on habeas corpus by the
Common Pleas, and was then rearrested under the terms of the protection. The Common
Pleas at this point imprisoned the persons responsible for Searche's second arrest.
The Council's own power to arrest was more directly called in question by the Common
Pleas the same term and year, in Bowel's Case, 1 Leo. 70, 74 Eng. Rep. (1587), where
a return on habeas corpus, stating merely that the arrest had been ordered by a single Privy
Councillor, was held insufficient at a first hearing. (A sinillar return had likewise been
held insufficient the previous spring in Hellyard's Case, 2 Leo. 176, 74 Eng. Rep. 455).
The return was then amended to show that the arrest had been ordered by the whole Privy
Council. This return was held sufficient, even though no cause for the arrest was specified.
The conclusion drawn by the reporter is that cause for arrest must be stated where ordered
by a single Privy Councillor, but not where arrest is ordered by the whole Privy Council;
anticipating on the latter point the conclusion in the declaration of the judges in 1591,
discussed in the text immediately following. Apparently the contest in this case did not
arise out of aid to a debtor since the Council Register refers the next January, to a John
Howell who had been involved in arranging the escape of a prisoner. Dasent XV 347 (1588).
168 Dasent XX 9 (1590).
165 Dasent
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a person imprisoned by the Queen or Privy- Council could be detained
in prison. The declaration was signed by all the judges of the Queen's
Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer. It recited that divers persons
had been imprisoned for prosecuting ordinary actions at common law,
even after judgment; that others had been imprisoned "against the
law" and when writs had been issued to secure their release no sufficient cause for imprisonment was stated; that some persons after securing their release had been re-committed to prison in secret places; and
that divers persons to secure their release from imprisonment had been
forced to release their common law causes of action or the benefit of
judgments; "for remedy in which behalf we are almost daily called
upon to minister justice according to law, whereunto we are bound by
our office and oath." Apart from their general appeal to the Chancellor
and Treasurer to prevent such "charges and oppressions" to the subject, the judges had no real solution to offer. On the legal question
raised, their opinion was quite clear that imprisonment by order of the
Queen or Council was lawful. The report in Anderson indicates that
the cause of the imprisonment "ought" to be stated on return of a writ
of habeas corpus. But even this version does not suggest that failure
to certify cause must lead to the prisoner's release. It carefully omits
any claim that the sufficiency of the cause, when disclosed, could be
reviewed by the judges, and it seems most likely that no such claim
was intended.169
So the matter remained during the first quarter of the seventeenth
century, a period during which the common law courts expanded and
improved habeas corpus as a weapon in the battle of courts.170 At the
height of the conflict, in 1615, habeas corpus was tried in two cases
as a means of securing the release of persons imprisoned by order of the
Council, but the decision of the King's Bench, announced by Coke,
was very clear in refusing to release the prisoners.171 The challenge
of James Whitelocke, denying that the King "neither by commission
nor in his owne person" could "meddle with the bodies goodes or
1611 The

declaration of the judges is reproduced in two versions, one from BRIT. Mus.
ms. 68 and one from Anderson's Reports, by 5 HoLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAw, App. I. The language quoted in the text is taken from the Lansdowne Manuscript
version. The comments of 6 HOLDSWORTH 32-4 (1924), have been heavily relied on.
It seems especially clear that there was no intention to require a disclosure of the
cause for arrests ordered by the whole Council, in view of the conclusions of the Court of
Common Pleas only four years earlier in Howel's Case, l Leo. 70, 74 Eng. Rep. (1587) and
in Hinde's Case, 4 Leo. 21 (1576).
170 Dawson, "Coke and Ellesmere Disinterred," 36 lLI.. L. Rllv. 127, 138-146 (1941).
171 The Brewers' Case, 1 Rolle 134, 81 Eng. Rep. 382; Salkingstowe's Case, 1 Rolle
219, 81 Eng. Rep. 444.
LANsD.
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landes of his subjects," was met by a strong assertion of "his Majestie's
prerogative and his absolute power incident to his Soveraignty"; with
the net result that Whitelocke humbly submitted and apologized for
these dangerous thoughts.172 It was in 1627, in Darnel's Case, that
these conclusions received their final confirmation. The power to
arrest was asserted in this case on behalf of the King himself, since
the return on habeas corpus recited that the arrest had been ordered
''by special command of the King." The argument in that great case,
however, ranged over the whole s~bject of arrest by King and Council.
The decision of a unanimous court very clearly asserted the sufficiency
of the return and, thereby, the Crown's possession of abundant power.
Modern s~holarship has confirmed that this decision did not falsify
the precedents and was no mere surrender by a subservient judiciary.173
The intervention of Parliament, leading to royal assent to the
Petition of Right in 1628, brought severe restriction of the power of
arrest by Crown agencies. Even so, wide powers remained, as the next
twelve years were to show. By this time, however, the issues raised by
the Council's jurisdiction in private matters had become a minor phase
of the great debate over the nature and location of governmental
power. For the decision of these issues a war and two revolutions
were ultimately required.
2. Relations with Ordinary Courts
In general it was clear that the Privy Council, in its relations with
lower courts, did not claim or exercise the power of appellate review.
It was also clear that it did not have a general power to bring before
it cases already pending in the ordinary courts, comparable to the power
of evocation successfully asserted by the French royal Councils from
the end of the fifteenth century.174 These limited powers of the English Privy Council threw into higher relief the exceptional character
of its intervention. Its constant interference with the procedures of
ordinary courts raised constitutional issues, all the more serious because
the authority under which it acted had no broad or firm foundation.
172 A.P.C. 1613-14, 211-219 (1613). Compare the similar very positive assertion in
1616, in confirming arrests ordered by the Commissioners for Sewers, that the power to
arrest was necessary and had been validly delegated. A.P.C. 1616-17, 57. Some sensitivity
on this issue is suggested, however, by the reference to the Chancellor of the question whether
power to arrest had been conferred on the Commission for New Buildings, since the matter
"reacheth £arr into the liberty of the subject." A.P.C. 1618-19, 242 (1618).
173 6 HoLDswoRTH, HxsTORY 011 ENGLISH I.Aw 34-37 (1924).
174 2 CHENoN, HxsTOIRE GENERALE DU DRoIT FRANcAis PUBLIC ET PRIVE 551-2
(1929).
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To the principle that the Privy Council possessed no powers of
appellate review there was one -important exception. By ancient
privilege of the Channel Isles, appeal from decisions by the island
courts was au Roy et son Counsaill. This privilege was confirmed by
Council orders of 1565 and 1572, the Counsaill being defined as the
Privy Council itself.175 Particularly during the reign of Elizabeth, the
volume of Channel Isle appeals was large. A number of cases were
heard at length and formal orders entered confirming or reversing
decrees of the island courts.176 As a class they were extremely troublesome, since they frequently involved difficult questions under the
French customary law by which the islands were governed.177 In
spite of the protests of the Channel Islanders, the Council could not
resist the temptation to use the summary methods to which it was accustomed, and especially to rely on arbitration for saving of time.178 Furthermore, the Council did not consider itself limited strictly to the
function of appellate review, for it gave directions to the judicial officers
in the islands in cases not formally appealed or not subject to appeal.179
It was difficult, and not at all necessary, to draw a clear line between
appellate review and the wider supervision for the purpose of ensuring
fair and honest administration of justice. The courts of the Channel
Isles were no more exempted from this wider supervision of the Council than any other courts. ·
175 Dasent VII 223 (1565); VIII
176 illustrations: Dasent XII 120,

75 (1572).
187 (1580); XIV 174 (1586); XVIII 39 (1589);
XXIII 73 (1592); XXX 642 (1600); A.P.C. 1613-14, 46 (1613); A.P.C. 1625-6, IOI
(1625).
177 An extreme instance was the problem as to the customary law of inheritance which
had to be referred four times to commissioners to ascertain what the custom was, before the
Council could set down a final order. Dasent XXVI 248, 347 (1596); XXVIII 296, 418
(1598); XXXI 241 (1601).
178 In 1586 the bailiff of Guernsey remonstrated, inconclusively, against a reference
of an appeal case to commissioners to hear and end, claiming that this was "greatelie to the
prejudice of the justice of that Isle." Dasent XIV 31 (1586). A similar protest in 1617,
on the ground that reference to arbitrators violated the charter of the islands, forced the
Council to retain the case formally. A.P.C. 1616-17, 325 (1617). In a large number of
cases, nevertheless, appeals were referred to arbitral commissions, usually with the motive
expressed that the Council "be no more trobled." Dasent XI 387 (1580); XIII 388 (1582);
XV 48, 403, 427 (1587-8); XXV 151, 378 (1596); XXVIII 514, 596 (1598); XXIX
500 (1599); XXX 63, 161, 250 (1600); XXXII 363 (1601); A.P.C. 1613-14, 72, 91, 414;
A.P.C. 1616-17, 213; A.P.C. 1621-3, 70; A.P.C. 1623-5, 4, 16.
1 79 Instructions to award relief in cases not formally appealed: Dasent VIII 146 (1573);
XXV 378 (1596); XXVII 77 (1597); XXIX 728 (1599); case not subject to appeal
referred back for relief on claim of judge's partiality: A.P.C. 1616-17, 137 (1617); relief
ordered to person claiming oppression by powerful adversary: A.P.C. 1613-14, 453 (1614).
In two cases the local judicial officers refused to carry out such summary orders, but in
these instances the Council was able to direct that the complaints be transformed into formal
appeals and thereby to confirm the earlier instructions: Dasent XIX 251 (1590); XXVIII
286, 412 (1598).
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There were a few other instances in which the Council assumed a
responsibility equivalent to appellate review. Decrees of the Irish Chancery were reviewed on the merits in two instances, and in others, rehearings by the Chancery in Ireland were ordered.180 Similarly, orders of
the Council in Wales were set aside or their reconsideration directed.181
In one instance, a decree of the Court of Requests was in effect nullified, on the basis of a report from the Chief Justice of the Queen's
Bench that it was not justified on the merits.182 Review of decisions
by the Chancery in England was clearly a more touchy matter. The
procedure for appeal from Chancery decrees, by petition to the King
or Queen, was already est~blished.183 On the other hand, the working
relations between Council and Chancery were extremely close, if only
for the reason that the Chancellor himself was one of the prominent
and active members of the Council; it was accordingly natural to
entrust the execution of some Council decisions to injunctions which
the Chancery was requested to issue.184 The Council Register discloses two instances in which the Chancery was requested to grant
rehearings in matters already decided in the Chancery, one on the
ground of defective notice to a litigant and the other through suspicion
180 Dasent XXVI 28 (1596), the decree of the Irish Chancellor being found to be
"agreable to equity" in this instance and confirmed; A.P.C. 1626, 2, decree reviewed and
modified by the Council.
Rehearings in Ireland ordered, with the aid of the Irish common law judges: A.P.C.
1613-14, 241, 544; A.P.C. 1623-5, 286.
181 Dasent XXII 119 (1591), and XXVII 225 (1597), both being directions to remit
fines imposed by the Welsh Council; Dasent XIV 10, 187 (1586), and XIX 304 (1590),
all three being directions to the Welsh Council to reconsider orders in criminal cases that
were found to be too severe; Dasent XVIII 108 (1589), commission of three persons appointed to "revise and examine" a decree of the Welsh Council in which partiality was
charged.
'
·
·
182 Dasent XXXII 372 (1601). The case reached the Council through a complaint
of the party who had secured a decree in the Court of Requests in his favor, asserting that
the opposite party had failed to perform it. After the Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench
had reported that the decree was erroneous, the complainant was forbidden to renew his
complaint. After this decision by the Council it seems unlikely that the Court of Requests
would have been willing on its own initiative to enforce the decree.
No explanation at all can be offered for the action of the Council in undertaking to
hear and decide finally another case already pending, without action, in the Court of
Requests. Dasent XIV 105 (1586).
183 1 HOLDSWORTH, HisTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 372-373 (1922). An illustration of a
rehearing ordered in the Chancery through appeal to the Queen appears in MoNRo, Ac::rA
CANcBLLARIAE 626 (anno 1592) (1847).
1B4Dasent III 366 (1551); A.P.C. 1616-17, 39 (1616); A.P.C. 1621-3, 417 (1623).
The close connection between the Chancery and Council is further suggested by the entry
in Dasent XVIII 147 (1589), where a commission was appointed under the Council's
authority to investigate whether a party to a Chancery case had performed an order which
had been "sett downe before _me, the Lord Chauncellour."
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of corruption among the under clerks.185 In another case a decree of
the Lord Keeper imprisoning a litigant for contempt was reviewed on
the merits by the Council, after a reservation by the Lord Keeper
expressing his consent to the review in the particular case but asserting
that he "was not to render an accompte of his sentences in that or like
causes in her Majesty's said Courte, but onlie to her Majestie allone."186
These cases must be regarded as quite exceptional. A more normal
result of a discovery that the matters in dispute had been examined and
decided in the Chancery was a prompt and outright dismissal.187
Review of decisions by common law courts was an even touchier
matter. Yet there must have been many common lawyers who were
prepared to admit that one element in common law procedure, the jury,
was in need of greater control. So far the standard method of dealing
with false verdicts was the cumbersome and inadequate attaint, though
common law courts had long before asserted their own power to grant
new trials.188 The setting aside of false verdicts must have seemed to
the Council a natural consequence of its efforts to ensure the empanelling of impartial juries. One method of securing a reconsideration of
verdicts was arbitration, or perhaps a new trial with the consent of the
parties.189 But a clear enough case could induce the Council to direct
not only a stay of judgment but the grant of a new trial, especially
where the judges themselves were willing to confirm that the verdict
was plainly wrong. 190 The number of such orders is not large. But
185 Dasent XXII 209, 377 (1592). In Dasent XV 12 (1587), the channel of appeal
to the Queen had been used to attack an order entered by the Master of the Rolls in the
Chancery, but the Council directed the Master of the Rolls after his re-examination of the
case to report back to the Council so that it could determine whether the Council should
take further action.
MoNRo, AcrA CANcELLARIAE 469 (1847) reproduces an order in the Chancery issued
in 1579, revising a previous Chancery decree because of letters written by "some" of the
Privy Council requesting this action. The entry in A.P.C. 1613-14, 87 (1613) shows the
Council intervening to arrange some disposal of a debtor's estate less onerous than the direct
sale ordered by a previous Chancery decree; but the effort failed in the end and the sale
was allowed to proceed.
186 Dasent XXIV 33 (1593). After review, however, the Council confirmed the Lord
Keeper's decision and entered its own order for the contemnor's arrest.
187 Dasent XVII 38 (1589); XXIII 237 (1592).
1881 HoLDSWORTH, H1sToRY OF ENGLISH LAw 225 (1922).
189 Dasent X 372 (1578), arbitration by the Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench of
a case in which the losing party had announced his intention of bringing an attaint against
the jury rendering tlie verdict; XII 248 (1580), arbitration by a commission of laymen;
XII 11 (1580), new trial ordered by the Council with the consent of the parties.
190 Dasent XI 285 (1579), report to the Council by the Bishop of Bangor forwarded
to the Justices of the Common Pleas so that they may "at their Lordships mocion" stay
judgment and order a new trial; XX 56 (1590), Justices of Assize asked to relieve against
verdict after one of them had certified in writing to the Council that verdict rendered at
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the Privy Council, through this occasional intervention, gave its support to a practice that was to establish, one hundred years later, a more
rational mode of controlling the jury. Perhaps it helped to point the
way.
Far more common than either appellate review or revision _of
common law verdicts were the requests to common law judges to stay
proceedings in actions pending before them. It was this type of interference that raised the mast serious questions as to the powers of the
Council. It is true that common law proceedings were being interrupted on a far greater scale by injunctions from courts of equity; but
the tradition was already established that the injunction applied to
the litigant and left the common law court's function intact. It was
common enough for the Council to threaten litigants, and its threats
were at least as menacing as any the Chancellor could use. But it also
spoke to the judges, with varying degrees of politeness that left its
meaning clear.
Some of the requests for stay of proceedings were quite reasonable
and would have been unnecessary if common law courts had not been
tied by irrational technicality. Such, for example, were the requests
for brief delays while proofs were being assembled or witnesses secured.191 Similarly, where grounds for authorizing a new trial might
exist, as with a verdict based on perjured evidence, it was reasonable
to request the common law judges to stay execution pending further
examination.192
the last Assizes was a "hard verclicte"; A.P.C. 1613-14, 405 (1614), verdict obtained by
personal influence ordered set aside and case to proceed either to new trial or arbitration;
A.P.C. 1619-21, 72 (1619), new trial ordered after full hearing before the Council in the
presence of the two common law judges before whom the case had been tried at nisi prius;
A.P.C. 1619-21, 226 (1620), verdict ordered set aside and new trial directed after Justices
of the Common Pleas certi£ed that minor litigants were prevented from presenting all their
witnesses through an error of their solicitor.
101 Dasent XV 207 (1587), Justices of Assize asked to postpone trial until the following
term in order to permit a party to prepare his proofs; XV 195 (1587), Justices of Assize asked
to grant a stay until the next Assizes if they £nd that an essential witness has been "conveighed awaie by night." Similarly, Dasent XI 64 (1579), Justices of Assize asked not to
proceed with a case concerning which a suit was also pending in the Chancery, since the
death of the Lord Keeper had delayed the entry of an injunction against prosecution of the
common law action; Dasent XI 309 (1579), Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench asked to
grant a stay for 5 or 6 days to permit a jury attainted for a verdict some three years before to
read over the record of the earlier case. Other instances of temporary stays, with no reasons
specified: Dasent ill 403 (1551), Chief Justice of the King's Bench; VIII 14 (1571), Justices of Assize; IX 12 (1575), Justices of Assize; XIX 101 (1590), Chief Justice of the
Queen's Bench as to an appeal for robbery.
192Dasent XVII 208 (1589). On the other hand, it was possible to deal with such cases
through coercion of the litigant, as in the injunction issued in Dasent XX 298 (1591),
ordering the successful common law plaintiff not to take out execution on the basis of a
verdict secured through false testimony.
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With other types of stay orders more serious questions were raised.
The stay of lower court proceedings concerning private disputes pending before the Council was perhaps a natural consequence of its
authority as a prerogative court of justice, but the assertion of such
authority was itself significant.193 Again it was natural, but significant,
that the overriding authority of the Council's process should be asserted
by directing the Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench or Common Pleas
to stay common law actions against sequestrators who had acted under
the authority of the Council.1 94 An even broader principle of immunity of Crown officers for their official acts was enforced by directing
permanent stay of common law actions brought on account of such
acts. 195 Again, some general reasons of national policy might be advanced to justify the stay of common law proceedings brought for the
purpose of enclosing tillable land, where the Council in the North
had reported that the threatened dispossession of tenants "would be
a weakning to the Borders." 196 In other cases, however, no reasons
for stay could be urged other than general considerations of equity and
fairness between particular individuals.197 Whatever the grounds,
these requests for stay of proceedings were a direct interference with
the judicial function and an invasion of private rights, especially where
in terms or by necessary implication the stay was meant as permanent.
It was the activity of the Council and its various commissions on
behalf of distressed debtors that raised the most crucial issues. To
facilitate its own efforts to negotiate a composition with a creditor, the
Council in 1579 requested the Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench to
stay the creditor's action at common law.198 The principal problem
_1oanasent VII 397 (1570); X 39 (1578); Xill 163 (1581); XXI 42 (1591); XXII 23
(1591); XXVIII 239 (1598); A.P.C. 1621-3, 231, 416. Similarly, stay of a common law
prosecution was ordered in a case pending in the Star Chamber: Dasent X 274 (1578).
194 Dasent XII 261 (1580).
195 Dasent XV 332 (1588), Justices of Queen's Bench ordered to stay proceedings; XV
353 (1587); xvm 367 (1589); XIX 149 (1590); XXV 34 (1595); A.P.C. 1621-3, 479, 508.
In Dasent VII 212 (1565), the order to discontinue suits at common law against royal commissioners was directed to the common law litigant himself. It appeared in Dasent XV 308
(1587) that "two lewde and dysordered persons" had brought common law actions against
royal officers for ordering their arrest; for this contempt the two persons were ordered arrested
by the Council. They then sued out writs of habeas corpus, which the Chief Justice of the
Queen's Bench refused to grant, knowing them to be imprisoned by order of the Council;
and the offenders were directed to be kept in jail until their common law actions were discontinued. Dasent XVI 69 (1588).
196 Dasent XI 139 (1579).
197 Dasent XXV 377 (1596), stay requested of action in the Common Pleas against a
partner prevented from performing his obligation to account by imprisonment abroad; A.P.C.
1623-5, 29 (1623), stay requested of action in the King's Bench against a sheriff who allowed
a prisoner to escape but who had since recaptured him.
10s Dasent XI 27 (1579).
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soon became that of maintaining the authority of the Council's commissions, to which the campaign was mainly delegated. The Council
intervened not only to threaten a creditor with imprisonment for disobedience of a commission's decision,1 99 but to enjoin the litigant from
suing at common law against the commissioners themselves for their
efforts to carry out the Council's instructions. 200 In two cases the Chief
Justice of the Queen's Bench was asked to grant a stay of actions against
the commissioners.201 In 1587 commissioners were prosecuted in the
Common Pleas for praemunire, with results that are not disclosed. 202
Faced with risks like these, tlie commissioners were unable to show the
desired enthusiasm for their task, though the Council repeatedly bolstered their courage by promises to protect them against any actions by
frustrated creditors and to commit any persons molesting them. The
Council had taken the precaution to include the two Chief Justices
as members of the large Commissions for Poor Prisoners appointed in
1589 and 1590. The other members of the Commissions were urged
to consult the Chief Justices in any difficulties and to secure aid and
support from this source. 203 The divided loyalties that these appointments created must have put the Chief Justices in a most difficult
position. It was perhaps for this reason that a collective protest from
all the common law judges was decided upon in June, 1591.204 As has
already been indicated, the protest used strong language in condemning
the invasion of private rights and the interference with judicial functions that had occurred in the recent past, though it suggested no real
solution other than the Council's own self-restraint. 205
100 Dasent XVII

6 (1588).
XIV 310 (1587).
201 Dasent X 255 (1578); XIX 441 (1590); the latter entry including a request to the
Chief Justice to arbitrate the case himself, even though judgment against one of the commissioners for false imprisonment had already been recovered. In Dasent XX 41 (1590), the
common law action against a commissioner had been merely commenced, and had not gone to
judgment; the solution adopted by the Council was merely to refer the matter to two laymen for
arbitration.
202 Dasent XV 99 (1587), the order of the Council being issued by the Chancellor and
Treasurer only and providing that the Master of the Rolls and Solicitor General were to
meet with the parties and the indicted commissioners and settle the matter if they could;
otherwise to report back to the Chancellor.
203 Dasent XVIII 109 (1589); XIX 182, 396 (1590); XX 9 (1590).
204 In both the versions of the judges' declaration reproduced in 5 HOLDSWORTH, HisTORY
OF ENGUSH LAw, App. I, pp. 495-7 (1924), it appears from the recitals that the Chancellor
and Treasurer had asked "divers" of the judges for their opinions as to the legality of
imprisonment by Queen or Council. There is no indication of the date of the inquiries, or
to whom they were addressed.
205 Supra, Section F I.
200 Dasent
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The years 1587-1591 mark a crisis in the relations of the Crown
with common law courts that can be compared only with the crisis
generated by Coke some twenty years later. The attack of the common
lawyers in this earlier period was concentrated on narrower, but equally
crucial issues. The chief weapon was the writ of habeas corpus. It
was a remarkable eruption in the Common Pleas in 1587, when habeas
corpus was used to release a person imprisoned by the Queen's direct
order. It was still more remarkable that the rearrest, under the same
order, of the person released by the court should have led the Common
Pleas to retaliate by imprisoning those responsible for the second
arrest. 206 The Council's concern over the whole situation was expressed in its letter of April 28, 1588, addressed to the judges of the
Queen's Bench and reciting that "certain persons" imprisoned by members of the Privy Council had been released on habeas corpus "without
their Lordships' knowledge or privytie." The judges were "required
and admonyshed" that they were, out of respect for the Council, to
notify the individual Councillor who had signed the commitment order
before releasing any such prisoner thereafter. 207 But the Council itself
was prepared to take strong measures, for in the same year it directed
the Keeper of the Marshalsea not to release a prisoner committed by
the Council, under a habeas corpus issued from the Queen's Bench. 208
The same measures were used in two cases in 1592, after the declaration
of protest of June, 1591, had been received from the judges. 200 It
appears then that by 1590 the lines were drawn for a major battle that
was not allowed to occur. No great divisions had yet emerged between
the Crown and the people of England over theories of government or
larger issues of national policy. Bound by loyalty to the Queen and
united by the recent great national effort in defeating the Armada, the
206 Searche's Case, 1 Leo. 70, 74 Eng. Rep. 65 (1587). The year 1587 is also significant
for hostilities between the Queen's Bench and Chancery, involving the use of habeas corpus
to release a Chancery prisoner and a resort to prosecution for praenmnire, with settlement made
possible only by the personal intervention of Queen Elizabeth. Dawson, "Coke and Ellesmere
Disinterred," 36 ILL. L. R:Ev. 127, 134 (1941). It was also in 1587 that the Court of Common
Pleas boldly invoked Magna Carta to justify its disobedience to the orders of the Queen, twice
reiterated, to admit an appointee of the Queen to an office in the Court. Cavendish's Case, 1
Aud. 152, 123 Eng. Rep. 403 (1582); discussed by Radin, "The Myth of Magna Carta," 60
HAnv. L. R:Ev. 1060 at 1077 (1947).
207 Dasent XVI 48.
20s Dasent XV 349 (1588).
200 Dasent XXIII 95, 330 (1592). In the second of these the order to the Keeper of the
Marshalsea included a direction that he was to certify on his return that the prisoner had been
imprisoned by special command of the Council, thus presumably complying with the legal
requirements of the judges' declaration.
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judges like other Englishmen sought compromise, not con8.ict. In spite
of the language of protest in their declaration of 1591, the judges were
no doubt quite honest in conceding to the Crown and the Council an
overriding power, which was part of the Constitution and which courts
could not properly restrain.
On the program of relief to debtors the protest of 1591 had a quite
discernible effect. The instructions issued to the Commission for Poor
Prisoners in April, 1592, laid principal emphasis on mediation and
persuasion and conferred no power of arrest. 210 The Commission was
continued until the death of Elizabeth, and received some support from
the Council through pressure_ directed to litigants. 211 In the reigns of
the first two Stuarts permanent commissions were abandoned and the
program of relief to debtors followed two quite divergent lines. Pure
arbitration, through ad hoc committees empowered only to mediate, remained extremely popular; this was the method chiefly used in the
system of personal justice organized around James I. 212 Where the
Council itself undertook to mediate, as it occasionally did, it still felt
free to request the judges to stay common law actions by creditors while
its mediation continued. 213 The other main alternative was the royal
protection, operating as a rule quite independently of any organized
system of mediation. General protections, effective normally for a year,
were issued in the name of the King himself, and forbade all actions
against the protected debtor during the time limit specified.
In any account of the relations between the Crown and established
courts, protections deserve a prominent place. They represent in the
clearest form an interference by the prerogative with the enforcement
of private rights. Unlike the specific requests for stay that have been
mainly considered, they were general in their effect. Their time limit
was short, seldom more than one year, but they were renewable and
were very often renewed. The infringement of a protection, by con210 The Commission is directed to have regular monthly meetings attended by the principal "persons of qualitie" among its membership, who will be able to give "more countenance
and authority"; if persuasion fails creditors are to be warned that if they later violate any penal
statutes or if any other advantage can be taken against them by strictness of law, they can
expect no leniency; and the common law judges are to be appealed to for aid in mediation and
for confirmation of the warning that no leniency will be shown where leniency is possible
under the law. Dasent XXII 384 (1592).
211 The Council ordered a litigant to appear before the Commission: Dasent XXXI 461
(1601); and when the Commission's efforts had failed summoned creditors to appear before
the Council for further hearing: Dasent XXII 354 (1592); XXV 414 (1596); XXVI 56
(1596).
212 Supra, Section E.
21s A.P.C. 1619-21, 75 (1619).
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tinued prosecution of suit against the protected person, exposed the
infringer to arrest and punishment by the Council.214 Protections were
common under Elizabeth; they were, if anything, more common under
the first two Stuarts. They were used not only for Crown officers but
for private persons in great variety. Granted by act of royal grace, on
recommendation of the Council or through the influence of courtiers,
they offered the possibility of a privileged class which was immune from
suit in the ordinary courts-a possibility that had already been realized
in contemporary France. No great extension of this device was needed
for the royal administration to exempt its acts from review for legality
by established courts. 215 It should be said for the Council under the
early Stuarts that it was alive to some of the dangers inherent in protections, that it was careful in protections to debtors to recite specific
grounds for the immunities it gave, and that it sometimes preferred a
less drastic course. 216 The question, which history leaves unanswered,
is whether this self-restraint could have continued if the views of the
King's men had prevailed and unlimited ruler-sovereignty had been
finally established, in England as in France.
On the whole the Council's interference with judicial proceedings
was acquiesced in by the Tudor judges. It is true that in 1550 Justices
Lyster, Bromley and Portman gave a bold answer when summoned
before the Council to explain why they had proceeded in a prosecution
for prae11iunire contrary to the Council's letters of "restraincte" addressed
to them: "Thei aunswered that thei were sworen to suffer the lawes to
have their due courses, so that without violatinge their othes thei coulde
214 Dasent XXII 441 (1592); A.P.C. 1621-3, 328 (1622). In the earlier case in Nicolas
VII 305 (1542), the Council not only directed the release of the person imprisoned in violation of a protection, but ordered the creditor to pay his expenses. Specific warnings to
creditors, without actual arrest, were used in Dasent XX 329 (1591); XXX 365 (1600); and
XXXI 426 (1601).
215 For example, the order forbidding any action to be brought by quo warranto to
attack a monopoly of glass manufacture granted by the King: A.P.C. 1626, 410. Cf. the
order to the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas directing stay of informations against London
merchants for ingrossing butter and cheese, in spite of the language of the statute of Edward
VI authorizing such informations: A.P.C. 1615-16, 524 (1616); and the direction to the
Chief Baron of the Exchequer to dismiss an information brought by a private informer for
the importation of wine in a French vessel, in view of the objections raised by the French
Ambassador: A.P.C. 1615-16, 238 (1615).
21 6 Instead of granting a protection, the Council wrote to the Creditors in A.P.C. 1623-5,
43, 52 (1623), requesting them to delay suits against the debtor. Similarly, in A.P.C. 1623-5,
309; A.P.C. 1625-6, 46; and A.P.C. 1626, IOi the Council wrote to arbitrators that the
members of the Council "do expect and thinke fitt" that the creditors refrain from prosecuting any actions pending attempts at arbitration.
In several of the entries there are expressions of reluctance to recommend grants of
royal protections: as in A.P.C. 1621-3, 114 ("although their Lordships are very tender in
cases of this nature"); A.P.C. 1621-3, 288, 407.
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staye no proces."217 The sudden and surprising revolt by the Common
Pleas in 1587, against the enforcement of a royal protection, was surely
a reflection of the same general state of mind. In 1591 came the protest
of all the judges against interferences by the Council, a protest that
required some courage though in net result it confirmed the powers that
it said had been abused. But apart from these examples there is no
record under the Tudors of refusal to grant the stays that were requested
. d"
or, more commonIy, "reqmre
.
With the appointment of Coke to judicial office, the conllict that had
been suppressed under Elizabeth could no longer be postponed. During the ten lively years of his tenure of judicial office, it was the power
of judicature that became, for the time being, the main battleground
of constitutionalism. Coke attempted in a variety of ways to assert the
supremacy of common law modes of adjudication. But the Council's
power to arrest he was not prepared to challenge.218 As to protections, it was to Coke himself, as Chief Justice, that the King and the
Council both turned for enforcement measures against creditors infringing their terms. 210 It may be significant, however, that the specific
issue which led to his dismissal from office was the power of the King
to stay common law proceedings in which the Crown had or claimed
an interest. It was the Case of Commendams that made final and
irremediable the breach between the Chief Justice and the King. 220
After the downfall of Coke there was no one whose conviction and
tenacity of purpose could organize the common law judiciary into an
217 Dasent III 159 (1550).
2 18 Supra, note 171.
219 The referral to Coke by the

King, with a request for punishment of the offenders, was
in June, 1614 (supra, note 139). In Sept., 1614, the Council requested Coke to arrange the
release of a protected debtor who had been imprisoned in violation of the protection in a
common law action of debt, "forasmuch as the gyving way unto such contempts toucheth to
neere the royall authority and prerogative of his Majesty, and the example may prove of
dangerous consequence." A.P.C. 1613-14, 548.
Coke's own discussion of the validity of protections is chiefly contained in CoKE ON LITTLETON, 130a-13lb (1853), where he reviews the extensive medieval learning on the subject. As to general protections, granted by exercise of the prerogative as a matter of grace,
he refrains from stating any conclusions, offering merely the extremely disingenuous statement: "Of these protections I cannot say anything of mine owne experience; for albeit queene
Elizabeth maintained many warres, yet she granted few or no protections; and her reason
was, that he was no fit subject to be imployed in her service that was subject to other men's
actions, lest she might be thought to delay justice."
The later history of protections is apparently one of gradual abandonment by the Crown
of a power never formally withdrawn. We have the testimony of Blackstone that the last
protection appearing in the law books is one granted in 1692 to Lord Cutts, "to protect him
from being outlawed by his tailor." 3 BLACKSTONE, CoMMBNTARIBs 290.
220 5 HoLDSWORTH, HisToRY o:P ENcusH LAw 439-440 (1924).
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effective opposition. By then, in any case, the powers of Crown and
Council in private litigation had become a minor phase in a much
larger contest, which could scarcely be settled by courts.

G. Conclusion
The question remains why the Privy Council under the Tudors
and early Stuarts maintained an activity in the general field of private
litigation, over so wide a range and at so great a cost in energy and
time. All the evidence confirms the conclusion that the private business of the Council was felt to be a burden, that it interfered with the
performance of far more important tasks, and that the reduction of
its volume became an objective of royal policy. 221 The question becomes more pointed when it is recalled that all its varied activity
revealed no purpose of major reform in private law doctrine or procedure, except in a single area- the development of more workable
and humane methods of administering debtors' estates.
During earlier stages of English history the expansion of royal
authority in adjudication of private disputes had contributed to an
important degree to the strengthening of the central government. This
was due not only to the new liabilities created through the action of
the central courts but to the control thereby established over local
government and over feudal and manorial courts. By the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries great changes had occurred. The supremacy
of the central courts was firmly established. The confirmation or extension of their authority operated to only a minor degree as a motive
for the Council's activity in the field of private litigation. On the
contrary, in much of this activity it competed directly with the royal
courts and encroached upon their functions.
It is true that the work of the Star Chamber in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries served to enhance the authority of the Crown
and to create new liabilities in the field of criminal law. It is also
clear that the Star Chamber was the Council in its judicial aspecta judicial branch that was increasingly differentiated in function and
procedure though it maintained to the end its intimate connection with
the Council, the essential source of its power. In institutional develop221 Even those who, like Bacon, were friendly toward the claims of the prerogative,
viewed with strong disfavor the "entertaining of private causes of meum and tmim," as is
indicated in Bacon's Advice to Villiers [6 SPEDDING, LETIERS AND THE LIFE OF FRANCIS
BACON 41 (1868)]. The efforts to reduce the Council's private business, dating from the
later years of Elizabeth, are referred to above, Section D.
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ment the growth of the Star Chamber parallels the formation of a
judicial branch of the French Privy Council, occurring likewise by
gradual stages in the course of the sixteenth century. Unlike its
counterpart in France, however, the English Court of Star Chamber
was specialized from its inception and became increasingly so. It was
a high court with very wide power, an essential instrument of Tudor
and Stuart government; but it was and remained essentially a court of
criminal law.
In its handling of civil litigation the Council showed no similar
tendency toward development of a distinct judicial procedure, administered by a specialized personnel.222 Petitions of private suitors were
intermingled with all kinds of administrative business. For the most
part they were dealt with summarily. Where formal adjudication was
necessary, the shift to a judicial role was accomplished without formality. Particularly under Elizabeth, the Privy Councillors most
active in dealing with private cases were men like Burghley and Walsingham, who were also carrying the heaviest burden in general administration. When committees for private cases were restored under the
Stuarts, the reasons were apparently the same reasons of convenience
that produced committees for other kinds of business. At least until
1626, when the published register ends, there appeared none of those
subtle changes in procedure, attitude, and membership that mark the
formation of a separate "court." The absence of these symptoms is
itself significant. There was as yet no impelling motive for extension
of the Council's judicial functions in civil litigation. Even those most
friendly toward the growth of royal power did not find here a really
useful instrument.
The intervention of the Council in private litigation was connected, in some aspects, with larger purposes of the central administration. The supervision it undertook over the administration of justice
was one phase of a broad responsibility over all phases of English government, and helped no doubt to confirm the authority of the Crown.
Aid to royal officers was part of a system of rewards for Crown service
and gave some guarantees of immunity from liability for official acts;
both objects were· important in developing new functions of govern222 A qualification of this statement might be suggested, to include the Court of Requests. The derivation of the Court of the Requests from the Privy Council is historically
clear; it acquired a distinct judicial procedure and a specialized personnel. But before the
middle of the sixteenth century its separation from the Council was quite complete and it
had become concentrated on its specialized functions as a minor court of equity.
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ment and enlisting much needed personnel. Aid to merchants could
be explained through the interest of the Crown in the promotion of
trade, and especially through the large influence that economic factors
had already acquired in foreign policy. Aid to debtors served in some
degree the interests of merchants and the orderly conduct of trade,
though it chiefly aimed to alleviate the hardships caused by an overdeveloped system of creditors' remedies. Among the main grounds for
intervention by the Council, aid to debtors was the only one that
sought correction of private law doctrine and procedure; but this was
because their harmful results were on such a scale as to create a national
problem.
Outside these principal areas of activity, a power to intervene in
particular cases could naturally be quite useful. It was impossible to
define in advance the types of cases in which some interest of the
administration might appear. The political prominence of the litigants,
the sudden intrusion of some question as to governmental powers, the
social consequences of the conduct involved (as with enclosures)such considerations in great variety might provide motives for intervention, to an extent not fully predictable. The power to act by
summary order or by more formal adjudication was a useful supplement to the wider powers of government that were concentrated in
its hands.
On the whole, however, the activity of the Council in private cases
went far beyond the areas, or the individual situations, in which specific interests of the national administration could be detected. The
explanation must be found in the persistence of medieval ideas as to
the responsibilities of the Crown in dispensing justice. It is easy to
understand why private suitors should have wished, so urgently, to
enlist on their behalf the great power of the King and his Council.
But response to their appeals required action in an immense variety
of minor human conflicts, unconnected with the broader purposes of
a national government or with any program of major law reform. The
willingness to assume this burdensome task can be explained only
through the continued vitality of a very old idea-that political authority implied a duty to ensure the realization of justice in the ordinary
affairs of men, a duty that could never be finally renounced.
One is bound to feel admiration for able men, with great power
and the courage to apply it, with a broad conception of their duties
and a strong sense of social responsibility. Especially is this so when
the work they did was useful, when it contributed in so many ways
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to the organization of English society and the resolution of social conflicts. Though its activities left no permanent mark on English private
law or procedure, the £.rm controls of the Council were an essential
part of the system of Tudor and Stuart judicial administration. Its
strong support helped greatly to confirm those ideas of policy and
morality that were later to be worked, by other agencies, into the structure of English law. Against this positive achievement, however, must
be balanced the dangers of authority in a group without specialized
training, impatient with formality and accustomed to the exercise of
overriding power. The realization of justice in individual cases required patience, care, and attention to detail. The judgment of the
Long Parliament in 1641, in abolishing the private jurisdiction of the
Council, was a judgment of condemnation on the institutions of prerogative government and the ambitions they expressed. History has
confirmed that the judgment was right-that so great a concentration
of power was dangerous, however wisely the power was used.

